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Abstract
The paper deals with the con°icting interpretations of the monetary policy carried out by the Federal Reserve during
and after the ¯nancial crisis of 2007-08. That policy has been labelled as quantitative easing. The ¯rst interpretation
of that policy is that the central bank will continue to °ood the market with money to cause in°ation or at least
in°ationary expectations. A depreciation would eventually do the same job too. Another interpretation, partially
based on Minsky's theory of investment, is that easy monetary policy carried out beyond the lender-of-last-resort
intervention might have the aim of sustaining the price of investment and validating ¯rms' plans. In other words, it
would be complementary to ¯scal policy with the aim of sustaining pro¯ts and investment. The problem is that the
Kaleckian model Minsky was using hardly corresponds to the present situation of the U.S. economy. The interpretation
here proposed is that the aim of monetary policy is the recovery of ¯nancial asset prices to sustain banks pro¯ts and
to restore the value of household wealth. This design might be considered as successful if we look at the recent data.
But those signals are not encouraging if we look at long term sustainability of policies. The recovery of stock prices
has encouraged speculation on anything possible by the big banks. Moreover the recovery of ¯nancial asset prices in
contrast to the slow motion of housing prices might increase the already high inequality in wealth distribution.
Domenica Tropeano, Universitµ a degli Studi di Macerata.
E-mail: tropeano@unimc.it.1 Introduction
The paper deals with the con°icting interpretations of the monetary policy carried out by the Federal
Reserve during the current ¯nancial crisis. This policy has been referred to as quantitative easing,
because after interest rates have been lowered near the zero bound, the policy has consisted in
the purchase of various types of assets form ¯nancial institutions, thereby greatly increasing banks'
excess reserves and overall liquidity in the system. With interest rates unable to go any lower, the
Fed has returned to a policy focussed on quantities (see Adrian and Shin 2009). This time however,
unlike during the monetarist era, the problem is not to control some money aggregate but to expand
as much as possible the supply of money and credit.
In the ¯rst section an overview of the main facts on the monetary policy carried out by the
Federal Reserve during the 2007-2008 ¯nancial crisis will be given.
In the second section the liquidity trap view of the current depression will be explained and the
monetary policy of the central bank will be introduced within this framework. The main thesis is the
central bank will continue to °ood the market with money to cause in°ation or at least in°ationary
expectations. A depreciation would eventually do the same job too.
In the third section an interpretation of the Fed's monetary policy according to Minsky is at-
tempted. An easy monetary policy carried out beyond the lender-of-last-resort intervention might
have the aim of sustaining the price of investment and validating ¯rms' plans. In other words, it
would be complementary to ¯scal policy with the aim of sustaining pro¯ts and investment. The
problem is that the Kaleckian model Minsky was using hardly corresponds to the present situation
of the U.S. economy.
In the fourth section I will argue that, if this model is modi¯ed in order to take into account the
evolution of the economy, another possible explanation arises. The Federal Reserve and the govern-
ment are simply sustaining ¯nancial pro¯ts earned by both ¯nancial and non-¯nancial corporations.
However, if no change in the economy occurs, this will set the conditions for another crisis. To date,
no mechanism exists that would restore lending after the collapse of the originate and distribute
system. In the originate and distribute system banks did not lend any more and held the loans on
their balance sheets but instead were just selling the loans to other intermediaries that in turn were
selling to ¯nance themselves assets whose yield was linked to the loans interest revenue. Since most
of these intermediaries did not survive the ¯nancial crisis at the moment this system is no more
viable. While the few big banks that emerged after the US government interventions are enjoying
huge pro¯ts on their trading desks, most local and small banks, whose main business is lending, are
in trouble and often are compelled to go into bankruptcy. Conclusions will follow.
2 The monetary policy by the Federal Reserve during the
crisis
The monetary policy carried out by the Federal Reserve during the ¯nancial crisis has consisted
initially of very gradual decreases in the fed funds target rate. This rate has been lowered from
5.25% to 0.25%. These massive cuts notwithstanding, the situation in the inter-bank market has
not improved at all and the market was virtually frozen for about one year. The reasons behind this
failure of monetary policy are many. The problem from which ¯nancial institutions were su®ering
was one of insolvency rather than simply liquidity, thus institutions would not trust each other and
would therefore not lend to each other, unless very short term. Moreover the inter-bank market had
changed, becoming a market in which non-bank ¯nancial institutions were exchanging funds on the
basis of repurchase agreements. The signi¯cance of the interest rate as a benchmark for the market
had therefore been limited. Even traditional banks were preferring other tools for ¯nancing rather
than inter-bank loans, where cost was linked to the federal funds rate (see IMF 2008).
Though the monetary policy response by the Federal Reserve has been quicker than that of other
European banks (like the Bank of England and the ECB), the sequencing of interventions seems to
indicate that the Central Bank had hardly understood the extent and the di±culty of the problem.
The rate cuts, as we can see in the following table, were periodically following one another, leaving
1the impression that the Fed did not grasp the situation developing on the money and short term
securities markets, which had already deteriorated by July 2007, when the main traders practically
ceased to do their job. Many scholars were aware that those markets were practically disappearing
and that the consequences to the rest of the ¯nancial system, given the web of interconnections, were
presumably enormous (see Dodd 2007). The Central Bank, however, seems not to have grasped that
point, since it waited until September 2007 to cut the federal funds rate, and then only by 0.50%. We
have to wait until the spring of 2008 to see the introduction of some measures, which bring relief to all
markets that had virtually disappeared after the breakdown of intermediaries. The primary dealers
lending facility was started in March 2008. Many other facilities that followed focussed on particular
markets since markets were so segmented that the injection of liquidity at one end would never reach
the other end of the system. From the end of 2008 through 2009, the Fed was engaging in a policy
called quantitative easing. Since the interest rate had reached its lower zero limit, the Fed planned
and implemented open market operations that potentially increased the supply of money and credit.
In the last part of this year, it has started buying long term treasury securities in a massive amount
in order to lower long term interest rates as well. An o±cial of the Federal Reserve reports the secret
of the apparent success of these operations is the size (see Sack, 2009). According to the authors,
the Federal Reserve now has on its balance sheet a total of about $1.8 trillion of treasury, agency,
and mortgage-backed securities. These purchase programs were not aimed at providing liquidity
but to keep private long term private interest rates at rates lower than they otherwise would be.
First estimates ¯nd that the fed's purchases has lowered the long term interest rate on treasuries
by 0.50%. while it has also lowered the rate on mortgage backed assets by 0.1% (see Sack, 2009).
The secret of the success, as Sack writes, is size. The extent of the interventions has been very large
with respect to the dimensions of the markets.
TABLE 1: Monetary policy measures by the Fed: Chronology
The monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve as a response to the global ¯nancial crisis
has aimed at increasing the supply of money and credit and providing. Lower interest rates on their
own were ine®ective in resolving the problems caused by the ¯nancial crisis, mainly the freezing up
of the interbank market. To complement lower rates, the Federal Reserve adopted a more aggressive
policy of ad hoc interventions in various money markets by purchasing assets of di®erent types with
di®erent maturities.
The reason behind this change in policy has been given by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal
Reserve, in a speech in which he writes explicitly that monetary policy is no more useful to ¯ght the
crisis if interest rates touch the zero bound. This was indeed what happened in the United States
after one year of very lax monetary policy and thus it was necessary to change tools. The Central
Bank had to be concerned with the liquidity trap that arises when interest rates are zero and thus
it had to follow a policy that already in the `90s has been followed by the Bank of Japan in ¯ghting
the Japanese ¯nancial crisis. At that time the Japanese central bank was trying to get out of the
liquidity trap by causing a rise in prices and a depreciation of the exchange rate. Nowadays the
United States experienced both a very lax monetary policy and a depreciating exchange rate. Some
scholars argue that they are following the same strategy once recommended to the Japanese to get
out of the liquidity trap (see Kregel, 2008). That policy has been labelled quantitative easing.
3 Quantitative easing and the liquidity trap
The situation in which the economy of the United States has found itself after the ¯nancial crisis
has been de¯ned as a liquidity trap. The same expression had been used with reference to Japan's
position in the 90s after the ¯nancial crisis. In particular Krugman (see Krugman 1998, 2008a)
has in various occasions underlined that the liquidity trap is not an obsolete concept, but that it
had been revived after the great crisis of 1929, namely in Japan in the `90s and in the United
States in the last two years. He argues in his ¯rst article on liquidity trap that monetary policy
is not ine®ective during a liquidity trap situation as it might, and in fact is commonly, assumed.
He argues that there is no reason to switch to ¯scal policy as the only available tool. Monetary
policy may indeed turn out to be e®ective if people believe that the increase in money supply will














Fed lowers target funds rate at 4.75%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 4.50%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 4.25%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 3.50%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 3.00%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 2.25%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 2.00%
Fed target rate is maintained at 2.00%
In conjunction with cuts by other central banks fed tar-
get rate lowered to 1.50%
Fed lowers target funds rate at 1.00%
Fed lowers target funds rate to a range 0-0.25%.
Fed target rate is maintained at 0.25%

















Term auction facility introduced an d the ¯rst auction
takes place.
TAf auction increased to 30 bn dollar every two weeks.
Term securities lending facility is introduced.
Primary dealers Credit facility is created
TLSF eligible collateral expands to include AAA rated
ABS
Lending to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at the primary
credit rate is authorized.
84-day taf auctions are introduced and the ecb swap line
is increased.
Eligible collateral for TSLF and PDCF expanded.
84-day taf allotments increased by 75 bn dollar, two for-
ward taf auctions totalling 150 bn dollar introduced and
total swap line doubled to 620bn dollar.
Taf increased to provide 900 bn dollar of funding over
year-end.
Commercial paper funding facility CPFF established.
Money market investor facility MMIFF is established.
Talf established to provide loans collateralized by ABS.
Fed purchase of GSE direct obligations begins.







FOMC announces willingness to begin purchase of long-
term Treasury securities.
TALF launch.
Announcement of a program to buy 300 bn dollar worth
of Treasuries and to increase the purchase of agency debt.
Talf eligible securities expanded.
Talf announces acceptance of legacy CMBS.
3continue in the future and that as a consequence of this policy the price level in the long run will
increase with respect to the current period. They must believe that the Central Bank is committed
to generate in°ation. If the central bank is not reliable in this purpose, for instance because it has a
strong anti-in°ationary reputation, this policy will not work (see Krugman 1998, p.4). The theory
behind this assertion is not related to the Keynesian liquidity trap. Krugman (1998) states clearly
that the liquidity trap concept stands by itself in any type of model. He addresses the question in
an inter-temporal neoclassical rational expectations model in which the allocation of consumption
between two periods depends on the time preference, on the nominal interest rate and on the price
level respectively in the current and in the future period. In a model with ¯xed prices the main
variable is the nominal interest rate. Thus, if the interest rate has reached the zero level and no
negative interest rate is possible, monetary policy is ine®ective. If, however, prices are °exible, then
monetary policy may a®ect the inter-temporal allocation of consumption over the two periods by
changing the actual and the expected in°ation rate in future periods. Basically if future in°ation is
expected to rise then people will prefer to consume more in the present period than in the next one
and this will stimulate the economy.
Krugman argues that a liquidity trap can occur even in a °exible prices economy and that it will
not cause unemployment. In order to get inter-temporal equilibrium in such an economy a negative
real interest rate is needed. This however can be reached by getting de°ation in the current period.
This in turn makes people think, on the basis of unchanged price level expectations in the long run,
that in the next period the price level will increase again. Krugman (1998) writes explicitly:
\Of course, in a °exible-price economy even the necessity of a negative real interest rate does
not cause unemployment. This conclusion may surprise economists who recall the tortured historical
debate about the liquidity trap, much of which focussed on the question of whether wage and price
°exibility were e®ective as a way of restoring full employment. In this model the problem does not
arise - but the reason is a bit peculiar. What happens is that the economy de°ates now in order to
provide in°ation later. That is, if the current money supply is so large compared with the future
supply that the nominal rate is zero, but the real rate needs to be negative, P falls below P*; the
public then expects the price level to rise, and this provides the necessary negative real interest rate.
And to repeat, this fall in the price level occurs regardless of the current money supply, because any
excess money will simply be hoarded without adding to spending. At this point we have a version of
the liquidity trap: money becomes irrelevant at the margin." (Krugman 1998, p.13-14).
The important case is that of a Hicksian liquidity trap. Here output depends on consumption
and insu±cient consumption may constrain output. A liquidity trap may occur because people
expect either that the price level will fall in the future or that next period's income will be lower
than the current one. In both cases, to make people spend now may require a negative real interest
rate, which is impossible to achieve with downward in°exible prices (see Krugman, 1998, p.15). This
simple model may be extended to take into account investment, the state, and the open economy.
The main conclusions however can be drawn just from the ¯rst simple model. Monetary policy
becomes e®ective even when the nominal rate of interest is zero if the real interest rate can fall and
indeed falls. Krugman (1998, p. 33) stresses this point:
\Second, whatever the speci¯cs of the situation, a liquidity trap is always a product of a credibility
problem { the belief by the public that current monetary expansion will not be sustained. Structural
factors can explain why an economy \needs" expected in°ation; they can never imply that credibly
sustained monetary expansion is ine®ective."
The argument above can hardly be considered Keynesian. It is an extension of inter-temporal
neoclassical theory of consumption allocation. Krugman (see 2008) con¯rms that his previous anal-
ysis of the liquidity trap may be applied also to the current situation in the United States. Yet,
the claim that the Federal Reserve is committed to raising in°ation in the long run cannot be taken
seriously.
4\It's a curious thing that even now, when we are clearly in a liquidity trap, we still have a lot
of economists denying that such a thing is possible. The argument seems to go like this: creating
in°ation is easy | birds do it, bees do it, Zimbabwe does it. So it can't really be a problem for
competent countries like Japan or the United States. This misses a key point that I and others tried
to make for Japan in the 90s and are trying to make again now: creating in°ation is easy if you're
an irresponsible country. It may not be easy at all if you aren't."(see Krugman, 2008, it is just a
column on NYT see web address)
\What's the answer? Huge ¯scal stimulus, to ¯ll the hole. More aggressive GSE lending. Maybe
a \pre-commitment" by the Fed to keep rates low for an extended period | that's a more genteel
version of my \credibly promise to be irresponsible." And maybe large-scale purchases of risky assets.
The main thing to realize is that for the time being we really are in an alternative universe, in which
nothing would be more dangerous than an attempt by policy makers to play it safe." (see Krugman,
2008, idem)
The solution the central bank has at its disposal in order to get out of the liquidity trap then is
to commit itself in a credible way to an in°ationary policy in the long run. It seems from the last
quotation by Krugman that all the measures taken by the Federal Reserve could be useful to pursue
this goal.
The liquidity trap view has also been explained in a modern fashion by Krugman and Obstfeld
(see Krugman and Obstfeld 2003) in their International Economics textbook. The starting point
is that, when the rate of interest is zero, the central bank can no longer use monetary policy to
stimulate the economy. This happens because even if the central bank tries to increase the money
supply through open market operations this will not make interest rates fall. If interest rates are
already at zero people will be indi®erent between holding money and bonds. Thus they prefer to
hold money rather than bonds and thus there will be an excess supply of bonds. Thus even if the
central bank increases the money supply in order to depreciate the currency the exchange rate cannot
increase if the rate of interest is zero. Thus this policy will not succeed in increasing output and
relieve a depression. The right policy would indeed that of making the market believe that the long
run future exchange rate will depreciate. This can be made either by expanding in a permanent way
the supply of money or by anchoring the currency at a higher level. Only in this case can monetary
policy be e®ective in increasing output.
The idea is that monetary policy can no longer stimulate the economy is because it cannot lower
the interest rate beyond zero. Then the only way to act on the real side of the economy and reviving
aggregate demand is through the trade balance channel. A depreciation will increase the foreign
demand for domestic output if Marshall-Lerner conditions hold, and it will raise output thereby
bringing us closer to full employment. Then the next question is how to get a depreciation. If you
believe that the exchange rate in the long run is a monetary phenomenon then it is su±cient to
increase the money supply and announce that it will be a long lasting policy. If this is not believed
by the market, it is necessary to intervene in the market and cause a depreciation. In both cases
the e®ectiveness of monetary policy will be resumed. This last case however does not suit well the
United States, which is a big open economy and in which the domestic demand is far bigger than
the external demand for domestic goods.
The policy pursued by the central bank may be criticized for di®erent reasons. Krugman is
arguing that it is right in so far as it creates in°ation. Others may argue that it is wrong even if
creates in°ation. For example Kregel (2009) raises another question. The policy of getting lower
and lower interest rates even at long maturities would not ful¯l the main task that authorities have
now, that of warranting some income to banks. Kregel (2009) recalls that the same re°ation policy
has been attempted after the 1929 world crisis and that it was abandoned for the same reason, that
banks' income fell because of the low interest rates. He distinguishes Greenspan's policy from that
pursued by Bernanke in that Greenspan paid attention at maintaining a spread between short and
long maturities interest rates thus making possible for banks to gain from the spread. Bernanke did
indeed the opposite in the two years before the crisis raising slowly but constantly the short term
5interest rate while the long term one did not follow. This then caused an erosion of banks' pro¯t
margin, since they had long term assets and short term liabilities. The recent interventions of the
Fed in short term money markets and the plan to extend this intervention even to ¯nancial assets
with longer maturities will tend to lower both short and long run rates of interest for a long time.
This policy, however, in Kregel's opinion, would not restore banks' pro¯ts since it does not increase
their pro¯t margin. The extension to longer maturities may bene¯t households, who have to repay
their debt but this e®ect may be o®set by the fall in interest earned on deposits (see Kregel 2009,
p.15).
Kregel's article was written in April 2009. The latest news on banks accounting show that they
are mainly gaining from their trading desks rather from their borrowing activity. This may be
due to the ever °ourishing speculation and to the prolonged use of the same derivatives that were
used before the ¯nancial crisis. An interpretation of what happened until now might be that the
central bank is not particularly interested in restoring the normal operations of banks and their
pro¯tability as resulting from that part of their activity but it is satis¯ed with the return of their
balance sheets from red into black, whatever the means to reach this result. Even speculation may
help in this! This would be con¯rmed by the fact that the same products, which were responsible for
the ¯nancial chaos that has led to the crisis, cdo and cds, have not been banned or restricted. They
are still present as part of portfolios of ¯nancial institutions. The markets for derivatives linked to
the securitization of mortgages loans have indeed dried up because of the crisis in that sector; the
industry however has now planned to open other business perspectives by employing the same tools
like the CDS in the insurance industry (see Auerback and Wray 2009).
4 Quantitative easing as a policy to stabilize pro¯ts: a Min-
skyan analysis
In this section we shall deal with another possible interpretation of the quantitative easing policy,
this time drawing on a very di®erent theoretical background, the Minskyan analysis of ¯nancial
crises and his considerations on the task of policy during the crises. His starting point, on which
the analysis of the e®ectiveness of policy is built upon, is the macroeconomic model inherited by
Kalecki. In the following we will shortly describe with some algebra this model, discuss the policy
considerations that may be derived from it and whether it may be applied to the current crisis.
Equation 1 de¯nes consumption as the sum of wages earned in the consumption goods and
investment sectors. Pro¯ts in the consumption sector are equal to the price of consumption goods
multiplied by the quantity minus wages multiplied by the number of employed workers (see equation
2). Pro¯ts in the consumption sector are equal to wages multiplied by the number of workers
in the investment goods sector. Pro¯ts in the investment sector are calculated in the same way
(see equation 3). By rearranging, we get the equation that shows that total pro¯ts are equal to
investment. By introducing in this simple model, the state, consumption out of pro¯ts and the
foreign sector one can rewrite the equation for pro¯ts. Pro¯ts would then depend on investment
plus state de¯cit plus consumption out of pro¯ts minus saving out of wages and plus the surplus in
the balance of payments (see equation 9).
(1)C = WcNc + WINI
(2)¼c = PcQc ¡ WcNc = WINI
(3)¼I = PIQI ¡ WINI = ¼I
(4)¼I = ¼
(5)PIQI = I
(6)¼ = WINI + ¼I = I
(7)¼ = I + Df
(8)¼ = I + Df + C¼ ¡ sW
(9)¼ = I + Df + C¼ ¡ sW + BPS
The last equation (9) is a more realistic step in order to take into account how stabilization policy
6might work. In the present environment, the state is an important economic agent and workers save
while capitalists consume part of their savings rather than investing all of them.
Minsky concentrates on ¯scal policy as the main stabilization tool in order to avoid a depression.
Fiscal policy would stabilize pro¯ts through a double e®ect. The ¯rst is the obvious one whereby
increased demand by the state sustains sales and thus in the above equation hinders that quantities
fall, the other is through the e®ect on mark-ups. An increase in state expenditure should increase the
mark-up (see Minsky, 1982, p.85, footnote 2 p.88-89). The total e®ect will be stag°ation. Prices will
be increasing even if demand is falling. In°ation is the way a big recession has been avoided in the
1970s. Every increase in expenditures on consumption goods ¯nanced by transfer expenses or pro¯t
income is in°ationary. In°ation is one way to mitigate the payments on past debt. In the aggregate
the unwise and risky behaviour of bankers and business men is repaired through an economic policy
that convalidates pro¯ts. Public de¯cits lead to pro¯ts that convalidate past aggregate investment
and the total liabilities of enterprises but the price to be paid for this result is a growing in°ation
and ine±cient management techniques .
The current situation is such that, if one wants to use Minsky's theory to show the results of
current policy, the e®ects of projected ¯scal de¯cit on demand depend on the items on which state
expenditures are used. Most of the current and future debt by the state stem out of measure that
aim at supporting the ¯nancial system. Their weight even simply from the accounting perspective
is di±cult to assess (see IMF 2009). Now there is the proposal of stimulating the economy through
various tools mainly tax cuts rather increases in state expenditure. In that sense it cannot be argued
that the several measures that have been taken and that are being registered as negative items in
the state balance will sustain the economy because they support aggregate demand and thus ¯rms
pro¯ts.
While in the traditional closed economy version of the equations above, it is simply investment
that causes pro¯ts as underlined by Minsky himself, in contemporary capitalism other items such as
fall in the saving ratio, state de¯cit and others appear to be more important in performing that task
(see Toporowski 2008). Minsky's model, however, could be saved by arguing that all the monetary
and ¯scal measures undertaken until now amount to supporting or increasing the price of capital
PI. This would help to avoid a depression which would be triggered by the fall of the demand price
of capital below the supply price of it in Minskian terms. The relevance of this strategy however
would be weakened in an environment where investment does not play a big role in supporting
aggregate demand. In the last decades, consumption, mainly ¯nanced by debt, has been the major
imputus supporting the expansion of aggregate demand. One could imagine that this growth model
must be de¯nitely abandoned and that the crisis might o®er an occasion to change and to switch
to an investment driven expansion. In that case the most appropriate candidate to sustain that
expansion would be public investment, perhaps in infrastructure according to the Keynesian public
works tradition. So far, however, the only plans of the government are directed towards cutting
taxes, not only for the richer people but also for the poorer ones, which would in any case support
consumption by increasing disposable income.
As Toporowski (2008) argues, in the current ¯nancialized environment, the decline in the savings
ratio becomes an important factor in sustaining pro¯ts. Another important point is that consump-
tion remains the main item in aggregate demand, the fall of which triggers the downturn of the
cycle. In particular in°ation in asset-prices allows wealthy families to consume out of capital gains
or by using the proceeds of selling in°ated assets. Thus, while a part of families were su®ering from
low wages and high expenses for insurance and housing, another part, the most wealthy ones, were
enjoying the gain of high asset-prices and used them as a means to ¯nance consumption.
Thus since asset-prices were an important way to ¯nance consumption and to increase aggregate
demand, any policy that aims at raising these prices further, after the fall experienced during the
crisis, will in fact sustain pro¯ts. Among asset-prices, one distinction must be made between the
price of durable goods, such as housing, and the price of ¯nancial assets. Statistical data on housing
prices show that their price needs a long time before reverting to pre-crisis levels. It is easier instead
to make ¯nancial asset-prices rise again. In the United States, those households able to purchase
a house in the last ten years before the ¯nancial crisis were mostly poor ones, towards which the
so-called sub-prime loans were directed. Those households investing in ¯nancial assets instead were
7wealthy families. By lowering all interest rates, even long terms rates, may help home owners pay
less interest on variable rates mortgages if their income is su±cient to repay the debt, but the loss
due to the fall in the value of the asset in comparison to the amount of the loan contracted may
even induce them to voluntarily default.
With respect to ¯nancial assets, however, home owners overall will have little interest in them
provided they invested their savings in housing. For wealthier families, the story is vastly di®erent.
While su®ering real estate losses, they will enjoy the rise in asset prices, both bonds and shares. In
this way the poor households who have contracted loans to buy a house will be hurt having only
debt while the households whose net wealth is positive (assets minus debt) will gain both because
of the return of assets values to higher levels and of a lower cost of debt.
5 Quantitative easing as a way to restore asset prices and
consumption out of wealth
A third and more credible hypothesis is that the central bank does not simply want to make re°ation
and depreciation their only objective. Neither does it want to support an investment led growth or
recovery, even less a public investment program. Rather, it wants only to restore the asset values,
particularly bonds and shares, in order to save the balance sheets of ¯nancial institutions of all
types, including pension funds and at the same time protect the wealth of most citizens. Since the
wealth, however, is unevenly distributed this policy will perpetuate the current unequal distribution
of wealth. Thus the unequal-consumption-based growth model would be perpetuated and the crucial
role of ¯nance in the economy would be perpetuated as well. The ¯nancialization model would not
be challenged.
We can also look at the data on the recovery of stock prices and house prices, as well as on
the wealth distribution to con¯rm the idea that the current strategy of the Federal Reserve is
perpetuating the existing inequality in wealth distribution. Wol® (2007) de¯nes marketable wealth
(or net worth) as the current value of all marketable or fungible assets less the current value of
debts. It is de¯ned as the di®erence between assets and liabilities. In turn, assets are de¯ned as the
sum of gross value of owner-occupied housing, real estate, cash and demand deposits, other deposits
and money market accounts, all types of bonds and other ¯nancial securities, cash surrender value
of life insurance, corporate stocks and mutual funds, net equity in unincorporated business, equity
in trust funds. Total liabilities in turn are de¯ned as the sum of mortgage debt, consumer debt and
other debt (see Wol®, 2007, p.5-6). Further Wolf (2007) calculates non-home wealth as net worth
minus net equity in owner-occupied housing.
Wol® (2007) ¯nds that non-home wealth is more concentrated than net worth, with the richest
1 percent (as ranked by non-home wealth) owning 42 percent of total household non-home wealth
in 2004 and the top 20 percent owning 93 percent (see Table 2).
Table 2 : The distribution of net worth and non-home wealth (top 20%)
year Non-home wealth Net worth Non-home wealth
Gini coe±cient Top 20% Top 20%
1983 0.893 81.3 91.3
1989 0.926 83.5 93.4
1992 0.903 83.8 92.3
1995 0.914 83.9 93.00
1998 0.893 83.4 90.9
2001 0.888 84.4 91.3
2004 0.902 84.7 92.5
Source: Wol®, 2007
Wol® stresses another point, which is relevant for the interpretation of the Fed's current monetary
policy: wealth inequality is positively correlated to the ratio of stock prices to house prices (see Wol®,
82007, p. 13).
Given the trends in housing prices and stock prices registered in the last year one should expect
a rise in inequality as a consequence of the monetary policy currently undertaken. In fact we can
see that the major stock indexes show a recovery of almost 50% with respect to the pre-crisis level
while the index of house prices shows a much weaker recovery rate.
This view seems con¯rmed by Weller and Lynch (2009), whose calculations of losses to households
as consequence of the ¯nancial crisis. They ¯nd that total net worth as a percentage of after-tax
income was more than 30 percentage points lower on average in 2008 than during the period from
March 2001 to December 2007. Moreover, they argue that two-thirds of this loss was due to declines
in housing wealth and the rest was caused by ¯nancial market losses (see Weller and Lynch, 2009;
Weller and Holburn, 2009). Given the di®erent distribution which we have seen between net worth
and non home wealth this should enforce the conclusion that the more damaged by the crisis were
those who on average own only a house and have some debt.
The recovery of stock prices, which is the major results of all the massive interventions in the
market by the Federal Reserve, would worsen wealth inequality. In fact, it would help the ¯nancial
institutions that do not lend but only gain from speculating on their trading desks and richest
households, who may restore the value of their wealth. It does not improve, however, the situation
of middle income and poor households, who have only home wealth and a debt, which is much higher
than the current value of the house. The lowering of interest rate would not help substantially in
reducing net debt.
6 Conclusions
Current monetary policy has evolved from traditional interest rate cuts to the so called quantitative
easing, that is increase in quantities through open market operations after the interest rate has
reached the zero bound. Its has evolved further comprising now of open market operations on long
term maturities to lower long term interest rates as well.
In this paper we have examined two possible interpretations of this policy according to di®erent
theories. The ¯rst one is the renewed version of liquidity trap in the version given by Krugman
and already applied to the Japanese crisis. This interpretation is mainly focussed on an inter-
temporal consumption model with rational expectations or perfect foresight. Its main insight is
that monetary policy can be e®ective even if interest rates are zero if it succeeds in governing long
term expectations on in°ation. In particular, the central bank, contrary to any wise purpose, should
make people believe that it is and will be committed to an in°ationary policy. Eventually also a
depreciation that produces in°ation in the future will do the job as well. Thus the liquidity trap
ceases to be an old-fashioned concept. In the present context one could argue that all the quantities
interventions by the central bank are aimed at creating in°ation expectations.
The second interpretation is taken from Minsky's model. In this context a very accommodative
monetary policy beyond the initial lender of last resort may be useful in sustaining the price of shares
and thus ¯rms' expected pro¯ts. This interpretation, though plausible, is in contrast to the current
shape of business cycles. In recent business cycles, the booms and busts are not characterized
by investment °uctuations but rather by consumption °uctuations. Minsky's theory of ¯nancial
instability is still valid but the version of this theory based on a business cycle that depends on
investment °uctuations does not ¯t current events.
Another interpretation is suggested here, that the aim of monetary policy is the recovery of
¯nancial assets to sustain banks pro¯ts and to restore the value of household wealth and eventually
consumption. This design might be considered as successful if we look at the recent data. But those
signals are not encouraging if we look at long term sustainability of policies. The recovery of stock
prices has encouraged speculation on anything possible by the big banks and pro¯ts related to it.
Moreover the recovery of assets' price in contrast to the slow motion of housing prices has increased
the already high inequality in wealth distribution.
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